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Introduction 
ANTHONY MUSSON AND CHANTAL STEBBINGS 
On a balInY SUInIner evening in July 2009, delegates froIn over twenty 
countries Inet over a glass of PiInIn's in the arboretuIn of the Univer­
sity of Exeter, an event heralding the opening of the Nineteenth British 
Legal History Conference - three days devoted to intellectual exploration 
of the Making of Legal History. The approaches to and Inethodology 
of the writing of legal history was for the first tiIne the subject of a 
major conference with lawyers and historians froIn COInInon law juris­
dictions of the world joining with their civillaw cOInpatriots to address 
the fundaInentalInechanics of their trade. A stiInulating prograInnle of 
SOlTIe seventy presentations transcending period and subject specificity ­
SOlTIe addressing the theme by lTIeans of a case-study, others espousing 
a particular approach - revealed the diversity and breadth of individ­
ual scholars' approaches to legal histiography. Its Catholic nature was 
underlined by the delegates attending: nleInbers of the legal profession, 
independent scholars, university teachers, archivists, librarians, doctoral 
students - representatives of every facet of the world of legal history 
research. 
This volume reflects sOll1ething ofthe eclecticisIn ofthe conference. The 
chapters, which have been contributed by legal historians from around 
the world, include the personal approaches of leading exponents, whose 
extensive expertise in the area has been acquired through decades of 
archival research. The basic cOInponents of a successfullegal historian (as 
Senn asserts) cOInprise a broad knowledge of the necessary sources and 
a criticalInind when ~pproachingtheIn. Methodology itself is accorded 
varying recognition anlongst the individual scholars, whose approaches 
range fronl the conscious to the instinctive. 
Legal historians can usually be characterised by whether the focus of 
their research addresses internal (essentially legal or doctrinal) develop­ ­
ll1ents within the law, legal institutions'-and the legal profession or exanl­
ines the influences exerted on them by external factors. Rabban points 
out how legal history research in the, nin:eteenth century contemplated 
1 
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the influence of external factors on the law, but acknowledges that it was 
not until the later twentieth century that legal history evolved consid­
erably as a result of researchers adopting ll1ethodologies froll1 the social 
sciences, linguistics, anthropology and other cognate disciplines to inter­
rogate their sources in the pursuit of valuable alternative perspectives. 1 
The transformation of legal history through new methodologies and 
advances in technology (giving rise to digitised, searchable resources and 
specialised internet sites), which Prest notes has occurred during his pro­
fessional career, not only yields possibilities for a greater understanding 
ofthe subject, but has also led to a growth in the popularity of researching 
in legal history, particularly by colleagues in other disciplines. Frecknall­
Hughes dell1onstrates} how an <interloper' froll1 the world of business 
with a background- in the social sciences approaches research of the fiscal 
revolt that confronted King John in 1215, an area of legal history that 
intersects with her own professional interests in the field of tax. Interdis­
ciplinary or cross-disciplinary research is now positively encouraged in 
applications for funding and acknowledged in research asseSSll1ent exer­
cises. But as both Senn and Musson warn, interdisciplinarity ll1ust be 
understood properly as a dialogue between experts in different fields and 
should not sill1ply entail an uncritical adoption of ll1ethods and sources 
froll1 another discipline. Indeed, legal historians ll1ust be prepared to 
accept that while fresh insights are possible (such as those tl1at can be 
derived froll1 analysing visual sources) there are lill1itations to such an 
approach. 
While legal history has ell1braced the notion that there is 1l10re to law 
than its forll1al sources, for ll1any the law itself forll1s that starting and 
end point. The legal historian's doctrinal knowledge, critical faculties and 
research skills are especially brought to bear in the production ofll1aterials 
for use by other researchers, be they fellow legal historians, ll1ell1bers ofthe 
legal profession or acadell1ics in other disciplines. Indeed, the ill1portant 
role played by the legal historian in editing legalll1anuscripts (notably law 
reports) is often overlooked or underplayed. As Baker and Brand make 
clear, it is not just a ll1atter of transcription and translation, but ll1aking ­
1	 Stuckey and Brand, for example, highlight prosopography as a method or technique that
 
legal historians might usefully employ for achieving data on social phenomena and pat­

terns ofinteraction among groups ofindividuals (such as members ofthe legal profession).
 
A number of papers presented at the conference but not included here demonstrated the
 
advantages and disadvantages of using methodologies derived from other disciplines,
 
notably quantification (Penny Tucker, Rebecca Probert, David Seipp and Henry Summer­

son), literary theory (Lorie Charlesworth) and music theory (Adolpho Giuliani).
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the manuscript sources functional and able t? be used as aspringboard 
for further research. This involves a ll1yriad of tasks, such as identifying 
surviving versions, dating manuscripts \and ,collating texts in differing 
hands froll1 various locations, correcting infelicitie,s and pointing out 
discrepancies in texts,_ highlighting differences of detail and ell1phasis, 
identifying the nall1es of persons and places, providing a context for 
cases and then Inarrying thell1 up with associated records. Providing a 
translation ofdifficult areas oflaw that reflects contell1porary practice and 
understanding not only requires a scholar equipped with the appropriate 
linguistic skills, but also dell1ands a cOll1ll1anding knowledge of doctrinal 
ll1atters, procedures and the personnel of the courts. 
The chapters highlight the multitude of legal and non-legal sources 
that can be drawn on to inform the writing of legal history. They also 
dell10nstrate an appreciation ofthe practical as weIl as the ll1ethodological 
problell1s that can surround analysis and interpretation of legal sources. 
Researchers ll1ay be blessed with a wealth of ll1anuscript or printed ll1ate­
rial in certain jurisdictions and for specific historical periods, but barri­
ers to effective research - whether it be into the legal issues debated in 
Elizabethan law reports (Baker), Victorian law reforll1 and law ll1aking 
(Stebbings), or the biographies of nineteenth-century judges (Polden) ­
are presented by practical ll1anagell1ent of the volull1inous records and 
the sheer till1e-consull1ing nature of ll1anual searching (in the absence of 
an electronic facility).2 A dearth ofavailable material is equally dispiriting 
and a considerable hindrance. Irish historians, for exall1ple, face eviden­
tiary problell1s posed by the unfortunat~ destruction by fire of centuries 
of Irish public records (Donlan), while those seeking to analyse lawyers' 
funerary 1l10nUll1ents or illull1inated legalll1anuscripts are faced with the 
desecration, dall1age and destruction wreaked variously by iconoclasts, 
robbers and those unaware oftheir significance (Musson). 
Legal history has always been a dynall1ic subject and the chapters 
dell10nstrate how the particular concerns and priorities towards it in indi­
vidual countries have fluctuated. Methodological approaches adopted by 
scholars in Australia, New Zealand and Canada (McHugh), post-colonial ­
Ireland (Donlan) and post-war Gerll1any (Senn), for exall1ple, have 
2	 Electronic search facilities are now available for some classes of record, but in order to
 
secure funding, the projects usually have to conform to strict parameters and not only have
 
to be manageable and achievable, but also provide value for money. The opportunities
 
for resource-enhancement funding formerly offered by the Arts and Humanities Research
 
Council (UK) have now been withdrawn.
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been heavily influenced by pre,,-ailing social and political concerns. The 
intrusion of the physical sciences on the intellectual debate in the six­
teenth and seventeenth centu'ries (Stuckey) and the social sciences in the 
twentieth (Rabban) underll1ined the prevailing dOll1inance that histori­
cal analysis of the law enjoyed in the past and effectively relegated legal 
history to the category of a sub-discipline. Its slightly uneasy position, 
nestling between law and history, rell1ains a potential source of tension 
and signifier of professional difference between acadell1ic lawyers and 
acadell1ic historians (Prest). As Heirbaut wryly COll1ll1ents, a perception 
still pertains all10ngst leg~l historians of the need to justify their histor­
ical work to colleagues in law faculties and seek the approbation of the 
legal profession as to its value. Stuckey, however, views legal history ll10re 
positivelyas a hybrid-discipline since exponents of law and history both 
seek representation of'authentic' phenoll1ena based on critically analysed 
evidence. 
The crux lies in the significance placed on law and history by the 
various interested parties and how historical research in the law is under­
stood and used. In this respect, several chapters tackle the relationship 
between legal historians and the legal profession. They do not investigate 
the respective positions of legal historians in different countries or the 
relative esteell1 accorded thell1 by-the profession, but they do highlight 
both the blurred boundaries and the differences of ell1phasis between 
what lawyers and legal historians want to know and how they portray the 
past, especially the posthull1oUS contributions of ll1ell1bers of the legal 
profession (Prest, Polden, McHugh, Rabban). The lawyer in search of 
'truth' requires certainty and the best, ll10st convincing evidence under­
scored with appropriate justification or legal authority. Legal historians, 
however, can show that legal 'truth' is no ll10re in the past than in the 
present and that a historical frall1ework ll1ust take account of a nUll1ber 
of different legalities. Indeed, they ell1brace a different kind of truth - a 
historical 'truth' that accepts uncertainty and appreciates the contingency 
oflegal author~ty and the sOll1etill1es shaky foundations of the law (which 
-lawyers rarely adll1it). In exall1ining the significance of ll1anuscript case 
notes in legal practice, Oldhall1 dell10nstrates how there were real-life 
practical dilell1ll1as in the eighteenth century with regard to the quantity 
and quality of law reports and how reliant the justice systell1 and legal 
profession were (and have becoll1e) upon a legal source that was 1l10ulded 
by chance factors. Sill1ilarly, Ireland and Polden go where lawyers fear to 
tread, exposing not only the elell1ents ofchance, but also the practical cir­
CUll1stances, the interaction ofpersonalities and the role of incoll1petence 
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and other human failings (in the people behip.d the law) that proliferate 
and cOIllbine to affect the Illakin'g of case law and professional reputa­
tions. 1t is, Illoreover, the attitude of th~ legal profession (and through 
thern, the justice systeIll) towards the legal past (and- the presence of law 
in the past) that signifi_es a divergence from legal historians, naIllely when 
the historical use of and role of law is harnessed for resolution by the 
standards and authority of today's law in conteIllporary courts and tri­
bunals (especially, as McHugh shows, in the relation to the land claiIlls of 
indigenous peoples). 
The notion that the purpose of legal history is to understand, restate 
and reforIll the law purelyon the basis of study of the evolution of 
doctrine is shown to be liIllited and dated. As Stebbings concludes, a 
proper evaluation of the forIllal sources oflaw in itself forces a researcher 
ofhistorical developIllents in law in the Victorian age (and probably other 
periods too) to break out of their traditional approach to doctrinallegal 
history. Moreover, the chapters in this voluIlle reveal that the direction 
in which legal history is travelling is much,more (how the law works' 
rather than the traditional (what the law is', showing a concern for both 
(law in action' and (legal outcoIlles' (the final decisions eIllerging frorn 
the legal process), together with an eIllergent field of (how the law is 
perceived and received' (and the iIllpact of that on its operation). This 
does not rnean that internallegal history is no longer of any value. While 
it is fashionable to pursue the external influences on law, nevertheless as 
Heirbaut Illaintains, a thorough evaluation ofthe legal context should not ­
be ignored. This, indeed, is a special task for the legal historian, whose 
training enables hiIll or her to understand the practical as weIl as the 
theoretical operation of the law. As several contributors indicate, it is also 
irnportant to be aware that what is found through investigation of the 
legal past is often Illerely a guideline to what happened, a gloss on the 
Illixed and (to the ordered legal Illind) wholly unsatisfactory Illuddle of 
reality. 
The chapters in this voluIlle are arranged theIllatically rather than 
chronologically and provide initially an asseSSIllent of sources and ­
approaches to doctrinal legal history, t~~n an exaIllination of COIllpar­
ative Illethods froIll various national and historical standpoints, followed 
byan evaluation of a range of interdisciplinary approaches to the sources 
for legal history. These chapters attest to the inestiIllable value that can 
be placed on accuIllulated experience - froIll faIlliliarity with particular 
source. material through time spent in the archives and from the habit of 
criticallegal and historical analysis - and demonstrate that much of the 
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burden of undertaking legal history research cannot easily be delegated 
to a research assistant as the science (or social science) Inodel would have 
us do in order to obtain the ,Inoney needed to pursue research in the 
sllbject today. They also celebrate the diversity present in legal history 
writing and-show a robust underlying discipline to legal history research 
across the world. 1ts exponents do not advocate an all-purpose, 'one-size­
fits-all' Inethodology, nor do they avow that one particular technique 
is more correct than another, though recoInInendations are tnade as to 
best practice in certain fields and appropriate approaches for answer­
ing particular legal research questions. Legal historians should not be 
afraid to adopt a Inultitude of approaches and experiInent in finding 
different ways to ascertain the 'truth' of the legal paste Continued coop­
eration across national boundaries and legal traditions and across the 
different cognate disciplines is a research iInperative that the contributors 
duly acknowledge. Use of a cOInparative approach to provide a 'strand 
of coslllopolitanisIn' and explore the cOInplexity of historical and legal 
traditions is advocated by 1bbetsoIJ. (and others),3 both to avoid excessive 
national insularity and to explore the relationship between law and the 
extra-judicial and extra-legal, especiallywhere it is not easily disentangled 
froIn officiallaw and established legal order (Donlan). 
Finally, the editors would like to express their grateful appreciation to 
those organisations which generously sponsored aspects ofthe conference 
that gave rise to chapters in this volurne (the Legal History Forum at the 
Oxford Faculty ofLaw; WilliaIn S. Hein & Co.; the Journal ofLegal History; 
and the Royal Historical Society); and thanks to all participahts, whose 
pertinent and insightful questions afforded a stiInulating debate both in 
and outside the conference hall, which itself is the life of lllaking legal 
history. 
This volume is offered in memory of Brian Simpson, who was to have 
attended as a plenary speaker, but was forced to withdraw through sudden 
ill health. His work has been an inspiration for many generations and his 
death in ]anuary 2011 represents a tragic 1055 to legal history. ­
3	 The editors note the formation of the European Society for Comparative Legal History,
 
whose inaugural conference was held in the University of Valencia in July 2010. Several
 
contributors to the volume were present and David Ibbetson's chapter was delivered as a
 
paper, there.
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The rnethodological debates in Gerrnan:-speaking
 
Europe(1960-1990)
 
MARCEL SENN* 
Why 111ethodology? 
In the early 1960s, there erupted what is now known in Gerlllany as 
'the lllethodological debates' of the social sciences. The debates were 
heavily contested, and the need for lllethodological reflection was not 
a given at the tillle. Disparaging COllllllents were often heard along 
these lines: lllethodological debates serve no purpose; they distract frolll 
real research; they are of theoretical interest only as they deal in lllere 
abstractions. 
With allllost fifty years of hindsight, we have seen lllany positions 
defended in the hUlllanities, covering the full range frolll controversial to 
flaky. It lllight be lllore plausible todaythan it was then to assert that lllany 
trends could actually be in need of SOllle sort of lllethod. To Polonius's 
falllous statelllent in Shakepeare's Hamlet, 'Though this is llladness, yet 
there's method in't!' we might respond: if only it were so! 
Taking the lead frolll its llleaning in ancient Greek, 'having a ll1ethod' 
means having a direction leading 'to a goal. Indeed, the ancient Greek 
word IJE608os contains this idea. Illlplicit is that the goal is shared all10ng 
hUll1an actors. Applied to the hUlllanities, having a ll1ethod llleans that the 
directions and goals - that is, the processes as a whole - are transparent to 
the participants, and the results frolll such processes will receive general 
recognition ofvalidity only when clarity is achieved. " 
The orientation towards shared goals and directions faces a variety of 
difficulties. HUll1anities and cultural studies are concerned with state­ ­
ments and distinctions about human endeavours in their temporal and 
local contexts. By contrast, natural sciences are concerned with invariable 
laws of nature and their ll1anifestations. In both cases, shared standards 
at the level of lllethods produce clarity in the chosen approaches and 
* Many thanks to my friend Professor Andres Buja, The Wharton SchooI, University of
 
Pennsylvania PA-US for correcting my basic English version.
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directions, which in turn establish validity of intellectual results. While 
the rigours of natural sciences would not be· reasonable in the hUInan­
ities, we can and lTIust adhere to high standards of plausibility by sub­
jecting arguments and resulting claims' to ongoing criticism. For this 
reason, lTIethodological debates are the true sign of a lTIodern concept of 
SClence. 
A zenith of m.ethodological debates in Germ.an legal historyl 
On the continent, in particular in GerlTIan-speaking Europe, we have 
faced gen.erallTIethological debates in the hUlTIanities. The lTIethodological 
debates reached their zenith between the 1960s and 1990s. They also 
influenced law in general and legal history in particular. The present 
chapter will focus on this particular aspect. 
One ofthe last congresses oflegal historians with the focus on lTIethod­
ological debates took place in 1996.2 Since then, things have become 
distinctly quiet in legal history. The result was to have ·always several 
lllethodological ways, however, any lTIethological reflection was an advan­
tage in any case and absolutely necessary to do serious research in legal 
history. , 
As of the lTIid 1990s, the debates becalTIe fewer but they still continue 
to influence research in legal history. The debates encouraged a general 
intellectual opening, and they led to new questions being asked, inforll1ed 
by other disciplines. The general opening also led to experilTIentation with 
new research lTIethods on historicallTIaterials. On the flipside, the debates 
produced lTIethodological extrell1es, too, that operated on lTIixtures ofI 
trendy theories or preached the Pllrity of one single theory. 
.	 / ') 
1	 M. Senn, 'Rechtswissenschaft und Geschichte' inM. Anderheiden and S. Kirste (eds.), Inter­

disziplinarität in den Rechtswissenschaften - Innen- und Aussenperspektiven (Tübingen,
 
Mohr Siebeck, 2012); M. Senn, Rechtshistorisches Selbstverständnis im Wandel. Ein
 
Beitrag zur Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Rechtsgeschichte (Zurich,
 
Schulthess, 1982); D. Klippei, Juristische Zeitgeschichte. Die Bedeutung der Rechtsgeschichte
 -
für die Zivilrechtswissenschaft (Giessen, Brühl, 1985); Gerhard Oexle, 'Rechtsgeschichte
 
und Geschichtswissenschaft' in D. Simon (ed.), Akten des 26. Deutschen Rechtshistorik­

ertages Frankfurt a. M., 22. bis 26. September 1986 (Frankfurt a. M., Klostermann, 1987),
 
77-107; R. Ogorek, 'Rechtsgeschichte in der B.undesrepublik (1945-1990)' in D. Simon
 
(ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik. Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der
 
Jurisprudenz (Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 12-99.
 
2	 The conference's transcript had been edited by P. Caroni and G. Dilcher, Norm und
 
Tradition. Welche Geschichtlichk,eit für die Rechtsgeschichte?/ Fra norma e tradizione. Quale
 
storicita per la storia giuridica? (Cologne, Weimar arid Vienna, Böhlau, 1998).
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Revolving basic conditions , 
The situation at the universities before and after 1968 
Several events and trends shaped 'the methodologieal debates on legal 
history in German-speaking Europe. Society at large and the universities 
in particular were involved with the 1968 IlloveIllents. 
The social fabric underwent radical change and generational conflict 
set the tone: a peace-seeking young generation opposed the VietnaIll war, 
searched for social justice, and revolted against their fathers and teachers 
who had spent their forIllative years in an altogether d~fferent experience, 
that of World War 11. In the face of these conditions, the idea arose that 
legal history as a discipline of law should put the fundall1ental issues 
of hUIllan justice centre stage and froIll this perspective investigate the 
historie cireumstanees of law in society. , 
Related to this point is the observation that legal history as part oflaw 
becaIlle a ~ubject in need of justification. In the course of the s<?cial and 
political upheavals, the traditional GerIllan notion of higher education 
(Bildung) caIlle apart and questions ofutility began to be asked ofsubjects 
that previously had been accepted as an unquestioned part of Bildung. 
Suspicions were raised that legal history represented Illere dead weight 
or aesthetic decoration in the practice-priented study oflaw and statutes. 
SOIlle forIll of utility had to be found for the subject, or else it would be 
relegated to a Illere preface or footnote of law. Proposals were Illade, in 
particular by the New Left, according to which legal history should place 
itself in the tradition of the EnlightenIllent, seek to expose the historic 
eontingency ofLaw, and thereby impact on the scientifie discourse oflaw. 
At the saIlle tiIlle as the deliberation as to the stance to be taken within 
the social and political discussions by the hUIllanities in general, and 
in particular, legal history, there was a concrete Illethodological offer by 
Hans-Georg GadaIller in 1960. His herIlleneutical prograIllIlle established 
a concept wherein the different perspectives afforded by legal, historical, 
social and political aspects were prisIllatically concentrated in a single 
focus. GadaIller's grand opus, Truth and Method,3 therefore, iIllparted -
IllOIllentuIll to a broad discussion of the role of Illethodology in the 
hUIllanities. 
GadaIller argued that the Illajor episteIllic achieveIllent of the hUIllan­
ities is understanding, or cOIllprehension and interpretation (Verstehen), 
which in turn is an applicative act that is Illore sustained than liIllited in 
3 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 6th edn (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1990). 
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essential ways by the historie horizon of the i~terpreting subj~ct. Others 
followed, including Jürgen Habermas and tue Frankfurt SchooI. They 
took the problell1 ofhaving an essential point ,of view to ill1ply that truth 
claims in the humanities required critical reflection ofl)-nderlying, implicit 
or even subconscious assull1ptions. These critics, largely on the political 
left, focused on the lill1iting aspects of the interpreting subject's historie 
horizon, whereas Gadall1er insisted on its epistell1ically and even onto­
logically constitutive aspects. In the ll1ethodological debates, Gadall1er's 
herll1eneutics and the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory4 were both in 
opposition to their shared straWll1an, a lill1ited notion of 'positivistic 
ll1ethodology' according to which rigid rules, approaches and protocols 
were the only sources of truth, even in the hUll1anities. SOll1e of these 
thell1es seell1 outdated froll1 today's vantage point, but SOll1e have also left 
a mark on today's methodological awareness. 
The nucleus of the debates 
Against this polarising historical backdrop that lasted into the 1970s, 
hUll1anities and cultural studies fell into two call1ps along the politicalleft­
right spectrull1, and accordingly historiography 4ivided into bürgerlicher 
(bourgeois) historicisll1 on the one hand, and Marxist approaches on the 
other. In response to the ll1ethodological criticisll1s based on Gadall1e­
rian herll1eneutics and Frankfurt Critical Theory, social scientists were 
called to exall1ine the social and political assull1ptions underlying their 
investigations of legal history, from bürge~lichetopics such as family and 
property to New Left topics such as the reconstruction oflegal practice in 
a dialectic~l hi~toric frall1ework. 
These developll1ents resulted in two opposite ll1ethodological 
paradigIns of legal history. In West Gerll1any, this controversy struck 
a particularly sensitive chord as a result of the afterll1ath ofWorld War 11. 
The country was divided over the politically charged questions of how to 
approach cOll1Inunist East Gerll1any, and even 1l10re so over how to face 
up to the Nazi pasta Political alignll1ent tinged all discussions, including ­
those of ll1ethodology in legal history. Even though approaches based 
on 'dialectics' were widely perceived as the 1l10st consistent and proll1is­
ing, there was a vigorous discussion in legal history that involved taking 
political sides on the left-right spectrull1. 
4	 The Kritische Theorie of the Frankfurt School is not to be confused with AngIo-Saxon
 
Iiterary criticism.
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The three basic model~ 
In spite of the political polarisation of the landscape, there was rOOIll for 
a third historiographie Illodel, one that drew on the soeial seiences as 
weIl as the historieist and Marxist approaches. The three Illodels ean be 
eharaeterised as folIows. 
The first Illodel, historicist legal history,- aiIlled at produeing narra­
tives eOIllposed of singular events, without elaiIll to generality or law-like 
explanation. In this Illodel one ean distinguish three sub-types: the first 
sub-type eonsisted of a dogIllatie interpretation of sources that deseribes 
history as a linear evolution. In this view legal history is just apreface to 
the eOIllprehension of law. This eoneeption had politieally eontroversial 
results beeause it would deseribe the GerIllan National Soeialist state as 
a forIllal rule of law. On the face of it, this was not entirely wrong froIll 
a dogIllatie point of view. The seeond sub-type eIllbraeed the eontelll­
plative interpretation of sources in relation to other objeetive Illatters of 
historieal relevanee. It aiIlled to reeonstruet a historie reality with elaiIlls 
to generality inspired by the natural seiences and their laws of nature. As 
for politieal iIllplieations, in this view the National Soeialist state was not 
a forIllal rule of law beeause it contradicted justiee and fairness in soei­
ety and state. The third sub-type was the IllOSt liberal eoneeption in the 
historieist tradition of legal history. Its approach was 'applieative' in the 
sense of GadaIllerian herIlleneuties; it eonsidered history as a eonstrue­
tion, and it was progressive in its requireIllent that authors aeeount for the 
intentions and assuIllptions under~ying their interpretations. Its interpre­
tation of the National Soeialist state used forIllal qualities deseriptively 
but denied the possibility that this eould be astate of justiee. 
Seeond, in opposition to the bürgerliche historieist Illodels (Illentioned 
further above), stood the Marxist Illodels of legal history, founded on 
'dialeetie IllaterialisIll'. This view postulated eeonoIllies as the driver of all 
Illatters of soeial, politieal and historie iIllportanee, the struggle between 
the soeial elasses as underlying all historie developIllents, and the eradi­
eation of oppression of one elass by another as the ultiIllate goal of soeial ­
evolution. Law in this eoneeption is a derivative of the 'dialeetieal' pro­
eess whereby the oppresser elass iIllposes its definition of law on all of 
soeiety. National SocialisIll, in this view, was a relie of the notion that 
5 See M. Senn, Rechtshistorisches Selbstverständnis im Wandel. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaft­
stheorie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Rechtsgeschichte (Zurich, Schulthess, 1982), 
pp. 118-175. 
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oppression is the basis of all society. The question of the rule of law is, in 
this case, irrelevant as it is ll1erely an expression of the Marxist notion of 
oppressIon. 
Finally, the third model of legal history integrateq general aspects of 
social developll1ent in historicist approaches by drawing on the social 
seiences, in particular on sociology, psychology and political science. 
It aill1ed at a notion of history that cOll1prehends the developll1ent 
and functioning of society in general. Froll1 Marxist historiography, on 
the other hand, it adopted a concern for issues of social justice. Both 
the borrowing of social science approaches and the focus on social jus­
tice proll1ised a type of analysis of historic ll1aterials that rises above the 
ll1ere narration ofhistoric detail and produces statell1ents of general and 
cOll1prehensive validity. The National Socialist state could be described 
psychologically as the use of the ru~e of law to ll1ask the brutality of 
dictatorship with the goal of usurping total power. 
The end of the debates in the mid 1990s 
The ll1ethodological debates in legal history faded in the 1990s. SOll1e 
contributing factors ll1ay have been the following. After a long period 
of intense ~rgument there was a general exhaustion as weIl as a lack of 
interest shown by the younger generation. The fall of the Iron Curtain 
and the opening of the borders between East and West ll1itigated the 
original conflicts that had driven the forll1ation of the ll1ethodological 
prograll1ll1es froll1 the background. A tpird factor ll1ay have been of 
an institutional nature at universities, the gradual vanishing of chairs 
in legal history. Between 1980 and 2007/2008 their nUll1ber shrank by 
20 per cent.6 This fact alone mayhave discouraged young aspiring scholars 
froll1 engaging in controversies and 1l10tivated thell1 to deliver 'solid work' 
instead. 
However, not all these facts and circull1stances were influential. The 
desire to work on 'solid science' led SOll1e to flee the ll1ethodological 
debates for safe havens, such as Niklas Luhll1ann's 'Systell1 Theory'. This ­
theory was taken so seriously that it becall1e a doctrine, and its adherents 
forll1ed what could appropriately be called a scientific sect. To thell1, Sys­
tell1 Theory was the only key that would turn the hUll1anities into proper 
6 www.koeblergerhard.de/juristen. Our own research has shown a reduction between 1980 
and 2008 from 20 to 28 per cent in all German-speaking universities. The difference 
depends on whether one integrates the newly founded faculties after 1980 or not. 
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sciences. The adoption of Systell1 Theory in legal history features two 
developll1ents: on the one hand, the establishll1ent of a 'fundatnentalist' 
group of representatives that tries to acl)ieve confessional purity;7 on the 
other hand, the development of a' 'syncretisti~' group that freely mixes 
Systetn Theory with other theories such as the sociology of Pierre Bour­
dieu and/or the structuralislll and psychology ofMichel Foucault. Studies 
in legal history that are inspired by these fads tend to be sotnewhat deflat­
ing in that they tnostly boil down to rather conventional descriptions of 
historical facts, albeit obscured by a peculiar vocabulary. Whether any of 
these two movements will succeed in our field is questionable,8 and they 
tnay have passed their zenith by now. 
Focusing on England 
As an outsider to British legal history, I could not presutne to speak for 
tnethodological debates (if any) in England. You, tny readership, would 
have to conduct this discussion on the basis of your own specific condi­
tions and scientific traditions. 
All the satne, I shall briefly cotnll1ent on~the British circutnstances frotn 
tny particular perspective. There tnight be sotne benefit in attelllpting to 
build bridges between two very different traditions in legal history. I 
would like to cOInpare the English and the Continental prograIllIneS, and 
to this end I will distinguish two aspects: thos~ of research Illethodology 
and those of legal education. 
Legal education has been very. different in England and Gertnan­
speaking Europe for a long tiIlle, dating back before the nineteenth 
7	 M. T. Fögen, (Rechtsgeschichte - Geschichte der Evolution eines sozialen Systems. Ein 
Vorschlag', Zeitschrift des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte, 1 (2002), 
14-19; M. Amstutz, (Rechtsgeschichte als Evolutionstheorie', Zeitschrift des Max-Planck­
Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte, 1 (2002),26-31; M. Aschke, (Evolutionstheorie 
für das Recht der Marktgesellschaft', Zeitschrift des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte, 2 (2003),25-38; R. Stichweh, (Systemtheorie und Geschichte' in F. Welz 
-
and U. Weisenbacher (eds.), Soziologische Theorie und Geschichte (Opladen, Westdeutscher
 
Verlag, 1998), pp. 68-79. Some critical remarks on the (System Theory' byP.-U. Merz-Benz
 
and G. Wagner (eds.), Die Logik der Systeme. Zur Kritik der systemtheoretischen Soziologie
 
Niklas Luhmanns (Constapce, UVK, 2000) as weil as for the facility to adapt it within legal
 
history by A. Thier, (Systemtheorie und kirchliche Rechtsgeschichte' in R. Helmholz et al.
 
(eds.), Grundlagen des Rechts. Festschrift für Peter Landau zum 65. Geburtstag, Rechts- und
 
Staatswissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen der Görres-Gesellschaft, voL 91 (Paderborn,
 
Munich, Vienna and Zurich, Schöningh, 2000), 1065-102.
 
8	 T. S. ~uhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (University of Ghicago Press, 1962). 
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century.9 As I see it, Continentallegal education at universities focuses 
on theory and critical reflexion of law and its' practice.10 During student 
training, we de-emphasise comprehensiv~nessofthe material taught, and, 
while we do teaeh 'knowledge', greater elTIphasis is qeing plaeed on the 
developInent of the eritieal faeulties. 11 By eOlTIparison, British legal edu­
eation differentiates lTIore elearly (than we do) between a theoretieal and 
a praetieal part of edueation. At university, students learn the systelTI of 
preeedents as a theoretieal way to aequaint thelllselves with the funetion 
of law, whereas at inns or law firlTIs they learn the praetiee of eonsultants 
or attorneys-at-Iaw to beeolTIe sueeessful barristers or solieitors. 
We eould debate the pros and eons ofthe two systelTIs oflegal edueation 
and ask whieh leads to greater expertise 'in analytieal thinking, reasoning 
and eritieal faeulties. Both systelTIs have their speeifie qualities, and in the 
end they lead to silTIilar results. Legal history, however, eould benefit if it 
were lTIore than the passing on of the knowledge of older ways and the 
mere narration of~owlegal systems developed their modern forms. Legal 
history eould eonvey a deeper sense ofhow to approach historie lTIaterial 
with a eritieal sense for its backward eonditionality, its forward relation 
to subsequent developlTIents, and its elTIbeddedness in historie, soeial and 
loeal eontexts. Such exalTIination of historie lTIaterials not only eonveys 
knowledge but also, lTIore ilTIportantly, fosters autonOlTIOUS eritieal skills 
of historie and eontextual reeonstruetion that transcends legal history 
and is likely to benefit all students of law. Therefore, ilTIproving legal 
edueation and history of law would require that legal historians engage 
9 M. Senn, 'Legal Education in England and the German Historical School of Law in the 
Nineteenth Century' in A. Lewis, P. Brand, P. Mitchell (eds.), Law in the City. Proceedings 
of the Seventeenth British Legal History Conference, London, 2005 (Dublin, Four Courts 
Press, 2007), pp. 249-61. 
10	 W. Ernst, 'Gelehrtes Recht - Die Jurisprudenz aus der Sicht des Zivilrechtslehrers' in 
C. Engel and W. Schön (eds.), Das Proprium der Rechtswissenschaft (Tübingen, Mohr
 
Siebeck, 2007), pp. 3-49.
 
11	 For instance, I train students to examine anonymised historical texts and to probe 
their substance beneath their historie detail and local colour. I thereby develop and ­
instil a critical sense in my students for the historie continuity as weIl as contingency 
of our modern legal thinking which otherwise would be too easily taken for granted 
as ultimate truth. See M. Senn, 'Die Bewegungsfähigkeit des Interpreten. Ein Beitrag 
zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Pädagogik der Textinterpretation in der Rechtsgeschichte' 
in P. Stoellger (ed.), Genese und Grenze der Lesbarkeit (Würzburg: Känigshausen & 
Neumann, 2007), pp. 75-93; www.rwi.uzh.ch/lehreforschung/alphabetisch/senn/cont/ 
080630_Bewegungsfaehigkeit_des_Interpreten. pdf. As to training for the practice oflaw, 
those students who wish to become lawyers take a special exam to become solicitors and 
barristers, as we do not distinguish between the two roles. 
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in a discussion of their Inethodologies,_ and this brings us back full circle 
to the main topic of this chapter. · 
Dealing with reflection and tnethodology 
As I conceive it, there are two basic cOInponents to a sucessful legal 
historian: broad knowledge of Inaterials, and a critical Inind with regard 
to approaches to these Inaterials. These two qualities set the stage for 
an autonOInOUS scholar who is able to analyse and reconstruct historic 
realities. Which approach a scholar tries first is of lesser iInportance than 
a critical attitude. For Iny part, over tiIne I have developed considerable 
scepticisIn towards holistic approaches that tend to Inatch historic realities 
to theory, as opposed to the other way around. In a GerInan context, Niklas 
LuhInan - Inentioned above - COlTIes to Inind. 
My preference is for clearly reflected b~ottolTI-UP approaches that stay 
near grou-nd level and closely hug the historic lTIaterial. In Inyexperience 
it is the exposure to the sources and the training of one's critical faculties 
on theIn that contributes to the general legal education ofstudents and the 
advancelTIent of legal history as a field. For the scholar, it is of the essence 
to preserve a critical attitude towards theories and lTIethodologies, both 
one's own and those of others. As a corollary, an ongoing debate of 
lTIethods is a necessity in our field. Reality is always lTIultifaceted and any 
theory is just a partial reflection of reality at best. Those of us who have 
practised at a court, a law firIn or a governlTIent agency know quite weIl 
the lTIeaning of reconstructing the facts of a case, and we are struck by 
how fragile and precarious each and every reconstruction remains even 
after our best efforts. This awareness of fragility is sOlTIething I personally 
acquired in legal practice, and I recolTIlTIend extensive legal practice as 
part of the education of legal historians. 
The fragility of the reconstruction of past realities as weIl as of any case 
we deal with at court is the reason why I believe that we legal historians 
are weIl advised to distance ourselves frolTI holistic approaches and the­
ories. If we take generalising theories at face value, we tend to get lost in ­
ideological territory and intellectual arbitrariness, as exeInplified by SOIne 
of the positions taken in the lTIethodological debates in GerInan-speaking 
Europe. I 
However, my scepticisIn towards holistic theories should not be taken
 
as a cOlTIplete refusal to listen to theories. Theoretical approaches can be
 
helpful in lTIaking sense of certain historic lTIaterials, if these approaches
 
are used as heuristics rather than evidence. A critical approach to
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historical sources is characterised by the awareness that all sources allow 
us to reconstruct just a small fraction of the complexity of a past reality. 
The necessary Silllplifications and points ofview inherent in any particu­
lar analysis always leave rOOlll for lllore than one defen,sible interpretation 
cOlllpatible with the sourees, and insofar they do not contradict each other 
but rather illulllinate different aspects and possibilities of past realities. 
Hence, llluitiplicity of re~sonableinterpretation does not lllean arbitrari­
ness, subjectivity, or lllere convention; llluitiplicity of interpretation is 
entirely cornpatible with high intellectual standards of argulllentation 
and progress of the field. 
Finally, I would like to put lllY finger on the delicate subject of using 
lllethods frolll other disciplines. In light of past experience, I alll rather 
sceptical when legal historians elllploy illlported lllethods frolll other 
fields on their own. /This, I think, is a lllisunderstanding of interdisci­
plinarity. An interdisciplinary spirit llleans a dialogue between experts, 
not a faddish adoption of each other's rn.ethods. Protected by a well­
developed critical sense towards theories and lllethods in general, we lllay 
have the best prolllise ofapproaching, ifnot reaching, anything that could 
be called historical objectivity. Under this sallle protection we lllay also 
be able to cooperate across national boundaries and legal traditions. 
-

